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POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES, VOLUME 3: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION. By William Winslow Crosskey and William 
Jeffrey, Jr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1980. $27. 
In 1953, Professor William W. Crosskey published two volumes entitled 
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States .1 These 
works attracted tremendous scholarly attention. Over fifty book reviews 
were written about them.2 Two law reviews devoted substantial parts of 
issues to presenting various commentaries appraising Crosskey's efforts.3 
Some critics heralded the books as a "major scholastic effort of our times,"4 
while others termed them a "farrago of fancy rendered plausible only by a 
confident tone, nice printing, and an abundance of notes and appendices 
referring to obscure documents and esoteric word meanings."5 Regardless 
of their viewpoint, all reviewers recognized that the controversy surround-
ing the volumes made their publication an important event in the scholar-
ship of American legal history. 
In his introduction, Crosskey made clear that these books were only the 
beginning, that at least two more volumes were planned.6 Crosskey noted: 
"While considerably more than is now offered is already in draft, it seems a 
certainty in view of the long time that it has taken to get these initial 
volumes into publishable form, that a long time must elapse before the re-
mainder of the book is ready."7 In fact, it took twenty-seven years before 
volume three was published. 8 Following Professor Crosskey's death, Pro-
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.S., 1975, Northwestern University; 
J.D., 1978, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey Shaman and Marcy 
Strauss for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. - Ed. 
1. 1, 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1953). The pages in the two volumes were numbered consecutively so that subse-
quent notes will not include references to the volume number. 
2. A bibliography of the reviews is found in Jeffrey, American Legal History, 19.52-19.54, 
1954 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW, 866, 881. 
3. 54 COLUM. L. REV. 439-483 (1954); 21 U. CHI, L. REV. 1-92 (1953), 
4. Clark, Have We Misread the Constitution?, 176 NATION 505 (June 13, 1953); see also, 
Corbin, Book Review, 62 YALE LJ. 1137 (1953). 
5. Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1456, 1486 (1954); see also, Goebel, Book Re-
view, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 450, 451 (1954) ("Mr. Crosskey's performance, measured by even the 
least exacting of scholarly standards, is . . • without merit."); Brant, Book Review, 54 CoLUM, 
L. REv. 443 (1954) ("Professor Crosskey has built one of the strangest combinations of fact 
and fancy ever put before the public. The combination is tragic."). 
6. W. CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at viii. 
1. Id 
8. 3 w. CROSSKEY & w. JEFFREY, PoLmcs AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES: THE PoLmCAL BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1980). 
828 
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fessor William Jeffrey, a former student of Crosskey's, took Crosskey's 
manuscript and notes and published the current volume.9 
Despite the authors' prediction that the third volume would stimulate a 
controversy like that accompanying the first two (p. 4), 10 almost no atten-
tion has been paid to the most recent work.I 1 Why is it that volumes. one 
and two were greeted with a "tumultuous reception" (pp. 3-4), while vol-
ume three has been largely ignored? In large part, the difference in reac-
tions reflects the tremendous evolution of constitutional law and 
constitutional scholarship in the three decades since the first volumes ap-
peared. Crosskey and Jeffrey dedicate their work to proving a point, that 
Congress can regulate intrastate commerce, 12 that is now completely ac-
cepted.13 Furthermore, they attempt to establish their contention by using 
a method of proof, reliance on the intent of the Constitution's drafters, that 
is now almost totally discredited.14 These factors, combined with the exist-
ence of numerous superior works describing the same period of American 
history, 15 ensure that volume three will remain largely ignored. 
To appraise volume three, one must view it in the context of the entirety 
of Crosskey's work. Crosskey, a New Deal lawyer during the 1930s, was 
frustrated by the Supreme Court's invalidation of Roosevelt's legislative in-
itiatives. As a result of these experiences, Crosskey set out to prove that the 
Supreme Court had misinterpreted the Constitution, that Congress pos-
sessed the authority to enact all legislation needed to regulate the economy 
(pp. 7-8). In 1937, Crosskey presented a paper to the American Historical 
Association that contained many of the themes his book would develop.16 
In fact, Crosskey's methodology and objectives never varied from those he 
set forth in his initial presentation almost a half century ago.17 
The central thesis of Crosskey's work is that the Supreme Court has 
ignored the Constitution's design of the proper relationship between the 
federal and state governments. Contrary to the accepted dogma, Crosskey 
9. In the preface to volume three, Jeffrey states that he added chapters one and two to the 
typescript left by Professor Crosskey. Professor Jeffrey states that he revised the remainder of 
the manuscript "along the lines on which Professor Crosskey had been working." P. xi. 
10. P. 4 ("The volume now in the reader's hands will in all likelihood stimulate a similar 
reaction."). 
I 1. As of December 1982, two years after the publication of volume three, only two book 
reviews, both critical, have appeared in print: Finkelman, Book Review: The First American 
Constitutions: State and Federal, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 1141 (1981); Anawalt, Book Review, 21 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1199 {1981). 
12. P. 7 (Crosskey's views on the commerce clause "were the remote origin of the entire 
project of these volumes."). 
13. See text accompanying notes 29-37, infra. 
14. See text accompanying notes 43-49, infra. But see, R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY Ju-
DIClARY (1977). 
15. Anlong the outstanding histories of the period between the signing of the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitutional Convention are G. Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); F. BRODERICK, THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
1776-1789 (1964). 
16. Hamilton, The Constitution -Apropos of Crosskey, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 79 (1953). 
17. The paper presented by Crosskey was entitled, 'The Language of the Fathers." Id at 
79. The focus on the language used by the framers is a major theme in all of Crosskey's work. 
Pp. 6-7. 
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argues that the Constitution intended to create a strong national govern-
ment with little power reserved to the states. Crosskey contends that the 
federal government is empowered with all authority needed to fulfill the 
hopes of the preamble to the Constitution (pp. 15-23). In fact, each volume 
of Crosskey's work begins with a dedication "[t]o the Congress of the 
United States in the hope that it may be led to claim and exercise for the 
common good of the country the powers justly belonging to it under the 
Constitution."18 Specifically, Crosskey sets out to demonstrate that Con-
gress is vested with total authority to regulate all economic activities occur-
ring in the United States, whether intrastate or interstate (pp. 7-15). 
Crosskey attempts to prove this conclusion by referring to the intent of 
the framers of the Constitution. In volumes one and two of his work he 
focuses on the language used in the Constitution and bases his argument on 
an analysis of what the words meant at the time the document was written. 
Crosskey states that he is following Holmes' famous rule of documentary 
interpretation: ''we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words 
would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English using them in the 
circumstances in which they were used" (p. 6). 19 
Following this principle, Crosskey offered a number of startling conclu-
sions in his initial volumes. For example, he contended that the terms of the 
commerce clause20 had been misinterpreted throughout American history. 
He argued that Congress' power to regulate commerce "among the several 
states," actually meant that Congress was given the authority to govern all 
commerce occurring in the midst of the people of the United States.21 He 
maintained that the term "among" did not mean "between" as it had been 
interpreted, but rather meant "within."22 Accordingly, Congress should not 
be limited to regulating interstate commerce; rather, it has authority to con-
trol all economic activity, including purely intrastate transactions. Simi-
larly, Crosskey argued that the word "states" in the commerce clause was 
understood when the Constitution was written to refer to the "people of the 
stat~s" and not to the political entities of the state governments.23 In sum, 
Crosskey argued that a proper interpretation of the commerce clause neces-
sitated the conclusion that Congress could regulate all commercial activity 
in the United States. 
In volume three, Crosskey and Jeffrey attempt to prove the same con-
clusion, using the same methodology, but by relying on a different set of 
primary materials. Specifically, the authors examine the events occurring 
between the signing of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tional Convention to support their contention that the federal government's 
powers, especially in the area of economic regulations, were intended to be 
18. The frontispiece of each volume begins with this same exhortation. 
19. The quotation is from Holmes, The Theory oJ Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 417-18 (1899). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."). 
21. W. CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 84-115. The first eight chapters of Crosskey's initial 
volume are devoted to presenting his views on the commerce clause. 
22. See, e.g., id. at 51, 74-80. 
23. See, e.g., id. at 55-69. 
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virtually unlimited. Crosskey and Jeffrey present a detailed examination of 
the pamphlets, documents, newspapers, and correspondence of this time pe-
riod in an effort to prove that their view is the correct interpretation of the 
Constitution. Unfortunately, the authors' efforts are directed to proving a 
point that is already universally accepted, by a method of proof that is al-
most totally discredited; moreover, even on their own terms, Crosskey and 
Jeffrey never prove what they set out to establish. 
I. THE SCOPE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Crosskey and Jeffrey do not aim merely to provide a history of the time 
period being examined. Rather, their entire effort is an attempt to prove 
that the commerce clause was intended to vest Congress with authority to 
regulate all economic activities in the United States. As such, the reader 
must ask whether there is any point to proving this contention. To the ex-
tent that they seek to document a point that requires no additional proof, 
there is little value to their effort. 
There is no doubt that when Crosskey began his work during the 1930's 
there was a need to establish that Congress possessed plenary authority to 
regulate under the commerce clause. From the late nineteenth century to 
1937, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the commerce clause to in-
validate numerous attempts by Congress to enact national economic regula-
tions. The Court held that the term "commerce" only referred to the final 
stage of business and, hence, Congress could not use its commerce powers 
to regulate other aspects of business such as mining, manufacturing, or pro-
duction.24 For example, a federal law imposing a requirement for mini-
mum wages and maximum hours for coal miners was declared 
unconstitutional as a congressional regulation of production, not com-
merce.25 The reach of the commerce clause was narrowed further by the 
Court's repeated holding that Congress could regulate only those aspects of 
business that had a "direct" effect on interstate commerce.26 Moreover, the 
Court held that Congress could not use its power to prohibit commerce 
between the states as a method for controlling intrastate production.27 
The effect of these restrictive doctrines was to limit the regulatory pow-
ers of the federal government during the Depression, when strong national 
policies were urgently needed. The invalidation of many key New Deal 
actions led to President Roosevelt's famous Court packing plan.28 In light 
of this history, it is hardly surprising that a government attorney such as 
24. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I 
(1895). 
25. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
26. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Rail-
road Retirement Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
27. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (declaring unconstitutional a 
congressional law excluding from interstate co=erce the products of child labor). 
28. For a discussion of the events surrounding the Court packing plan, see, L. BAKER, 
BACK TO BACK -THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967); R. JACKSON, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin I>. 
Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 347. 
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Crosskey would set out to prove that the Court was misinterpreting the 
Constitution. 
However, by the time Crosskey's initial volumes appeared, it already 
was apparent that the Court's shift in personnel and ideology meant that 
Congress would be accorded broad authority under the commerce clause. 
In a series of decisions in the late 1930's and the early 1940's, the Court 
explicitly overruled the restrictive interpretations of the earlier era.29 The 
Court held that Congress could regulate any activity that had a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.30 In fact, even purely intrastate matters that 
in themselves have a trivial effect on interstate commerce can be regulated 
if the cumulative effect of many such activities is significant. Thus, for ex-
ample, in Wickard v. Filbum,31 the Supreme Court held that Congress 
could regulate the amount of wheat that a farmer could grow for personal 
consumption because the cumulative effect of all of the wheat grown by all 
of the farmers for their own use had a substantial effect on the interstate 
wheat market. In short, the Court made clear that it no longer believed that 
the existence of the states limited Congress' commerce powers. 32 
Despite these expansive rulings, there still was doubt in the early 1950's, 
when Crosskey's first volumes were published, as to how far congressional 
powers extended. The controversy surrounding the appearance of the ini-
tial volumes and the numerous articles in law reviews dealing with the com-
merce clause during this time,33 evidenced the uncertainty concerning the 
scope of Congress' authority. By the 1980's, however, there was no uncer-
tainty as to Congress' ability to regulate all commerce, intrastate and inter-
state alike. The decisions of the past two decades make absolutely clear 
that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activities. For example, in sus-
taining the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court up-
held a ban on discrimination by a small local restaurant, Ollie's Bar-B-Q, 
because the combined effects of discrimination by many similar restaurants 
rationally could be perceived as having a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce.34 Even a snack bar in a local country club has been held to be 
part of interstate commerce.35 In fact, the commerce power has been ex-
tended to permit Congress to enact criminal laws that ban intrastate 
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. lll (1942). 
30. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 36-37; United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. at 119. 
31. 317 U.S. Ill (1942); see also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 
(1942) (upholding federal control over minimum prices of milk produced and sold intrastate in 
order to make effective federal control over minimum prices of milk distributed through inter-
state commerce). 
32. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 ("The [tenth] amendment states but a truism 
that all is retained which has not been surrendered."). 
33. See, e.g., Myers, Interstate Commerce - The Constitutional Interpretation of a Non-
constitutional Term, 17 U. Prrr. L. R.Ev. 329 (1956); Stem, The Scope of the Phrase Inters/ale 
Commerce, 41 A.B.A. J. 823 (1955); Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear- Commerce and JJue 
Process, 4 VAND. L. REV. 446 (1951). 
34. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
35. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). 
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activities.36 
In its most recent formulation of the appropriate standard for review of 
statutes enacted under the commerce clause, the Court held that it "must 
defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate 
commerce, ifthere is any rational basis for such a finding."37 It is virtually 
impossible to imagine any activity that cannot be regulated under this ex-
pansive test.38 In fact, almost a half century has elapsed since the Supreme 
Court last held that a congressional statute was invalid because it regulated 
activities that did not fit within the commerce power. Although the Court 
has stated that the tenth amendment creates some limits on the ability of 
Congress to use its commerce powers to regulate state governments, the 
Court never has indicated any intent to reinvoke a distinction between in-
trastate and interstate commerce. 39 
Simply stated, Crosskey and Jeffrey dedicate themselves to a task that 
already has been accomplished since Congress is accorded all of the regula-
tory authority that the authors argue for. Additional works about the ex-
pansive scope of the commerce power serve little purpose. 
II. THE AUTHORS' METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Assuming that the authors make a point worthy of additional proof, it is 
necessary to ask whether their method is capable of proving the point. The 
current volume seeks to demonstrate the proper interpretation of the Con-
stitution by referring to the debates and events that occurred after the sign-
ing of the Declaration of Independence and prior to the Constitutional 
Convention (pp. 38, 462).40 The authors assume that the views expressed 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1977); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146 (1971); see also Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited: The Federalization ef Interstate 
Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271 (1973). 
37. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Rec. Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). 
38. Commentators have recognized for over a quarter of a century that the interrelation-
ships inherent in the modem economy make any distinction between interstate and intrastate 
commerce impossible. See, Stem supra note 33, at 449. 
39. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional a federal law extending the minimum wage to state employees. The 
Court, however, did not deny that such employees were part of interstate commerce. Rather, 
the Court held that the tenth amendment limits the ability of Congress to use its commerce 
powers to regulate the states as states. Subsequent cases have made clear that Usery is a lim-
ited holding applying only to congressional regulations of states in areas of "traditional" or 
"integral" government activities. See, e.g., Federal Energy Regulatory Commn. v. Mississippi, 
102 S.Ct. 2126 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 102 S.Ct. 1349 (1982); Hodel 
v. Virginia Surface Min. & Rec. Assn., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
Thus, if there is any issue involving the commerce clause, it is whether the tenth amend-
ment limits Congress' commerce powers. Crosskey and Jeffrey barely address this, pp. 36-38, 
and their history of the pre-Constitutional Convention events contains no insights on this is-
sue. In recent years there have been a number of excellent scholarly works arguing that issues 
relating to state sovereignty should be left to the political process and not dealt with by the 
courts. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-
258 (1980); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49-82 (1961); 
Choper, The Scope ef National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The lJispensability ef Judicial Re-
view, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). 
40. This approach has been characteristic of all of Professor Crosskey's work. As Harold 
Lasswell noted in reviewing the first two volumes: "Crosskey believes that the historic inten-
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during this time period should guide the Court in its modem interpretations 
of the Constitution. This approach to judicial review, often termed inter-
pretivism,41 has been thoroughly discredited in the decades since Cross-
key's initial volumes appeared.42 
The authors premise their work on the assumption that constitutional 
interpretation should be based on an inquiry as to what the framers in-
tended the words of the Constitution to me~n (pp. 1-7). This limits the 
scope of the Constitution to what its drafters wanted to accomplish. Such 
an approach, however, undermines the very idea of a Constitution. A Con-
stitution is not a static document to be interpreted like a statute, but rather 
is meant to derive its meaning from the experiences of each new generation. 
As the Supreme Court stated almost fifty years ago: 
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century 
ago, or to insist that what the provision meant to the vision of that day it 
must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the 
Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means today, it is intended 
to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the 
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their 
time would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refuta-
tion. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice 
Marshall uttered the memorable warning - "We must never forget that it 
is a Constitution we are expounding."43 
The Court should not be bound to what the framers intended their 
words to mean. Contrary to Crosskey's and Jeffrey's assumption, the 
"Court is not dealing with the men who made the Constitution, but what 
they made."44 In fact, there are strong indications that the framers drafted 
the Constitution intending for its meaning to be defined by the experiences 
of each succeeding generation.45 Accordingly, those, such as Crosskey and 
Jeffrey, who believe that the framers intent should be followed, are obliged 
by that very intent to abandon such an inquiry. 
The framers clearly recognized that they could not possibly write a doc-
tion of the founding fathers ought to govern the interpretation given to the language of the 
Constitution by modern decision-makers." Lasswell, Book Review, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
383 (1954). 
41. Interpretivism is the view that ''.judges deciding constitutional issues should confine 
themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution." 
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980). 
42. For excellent, detailed critiques of interpretivism, see id. at 11-41; Shaman, The Consti• 
tution, the Supreme Court, and Creativity, 9 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL L.Q. 257 (1982); 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest far the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). But 
see, R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 41 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Although there are still a few scholars who at-
tempt to defend interpretivism, the clear weight of scholarly opinion, to say nothing of the 
consistent view of the Court, is that the Court is in no way obliged to follow the intent of the 
framers. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315, 316 (1941); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. 398, 442-443 (1934). 
43. Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 US. at 442-443 (citation omitted). 
44. C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 7 (1947) .. 
45. See Miller,An Inquiry Into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, Wit/1 
Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 21 ARK. L. REV. 583, 584 (1973). 
J. ELY, supra note 41, at 11-41. 
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ument capable of governing future generations facing problems they could 
never begin to imagine. They knew that a "nation wholly different from 
that existing in 1787, facing problems obviously not within the contempla-
tion of the Founding Fathers, can scarcely be governed - except in the 
broadest generality - by the concepts and solutions of yesteryear."46 An 
inquiry into the events between the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitutional Convention, therefore, has no relevance to modem interpre-
tations of the commerce clause.47 As Professors McDougal and Lans noted 
more than twenty-five years ago: 
[l]t is utterly fantastic to suppose that a document framed 150 years ago "to 
start a governmental experiment for an agricultural, sectional seaboard 
folk of some three millions" could be interpreted today . : . in terms of the 
"true meaning" of its original framers for the purpose of controlling the 
"government of a nation, a hundred and thirty millions strong, whose pop-
ulation and advanced industrial civilization have spread across a 
continent."48 
In sum, ''there is no acceptable theory demonstrating why and how his-
torical materials are relevant to the present resolution of present constitu-
tional problems."49 Even if there is a need to prove that the commerce 
clause should be given a broader scope, Crosskey and Jeffrey cannot suc-
ceed in this aim by appealling to quotations that are now more than two 
centuries old. 
Ill. THE INADEQUACY OF THE AUTHORS' EVIDENCE 
Assuming that there is a need to prove that the commerce clause should 
be given an expansive interpretation, and assuming that the framers' intent 
is relevant in establishing this point, it is necessary to consider whether the 
evidence marshalled by the authors establishes what they set out to docu-
ment. That is, does the work, taken on its own terms, effectively prove the 
authors' point? 
The authors exhaustively survey pamphlets, newspapers, speeches, and 
correspondence from the period between the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitutional Convention. They produce page after 
page of quotations which, they assert, support their central arguments. 
Even if the quotations say exactly what the authors claim they do, at most 
the authors have demonstrated that some people during this time period 
favored a strong national government with expansive powers to regulate 
interstate commerce.50 The authors, however, never demonstrate that a 
46. Miller & Howell, Tire Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 661, 683 (1960). 
47. P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 158 (1975). 
48. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional, Executive or Presidential Agreements: 
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 214-15 (1945) (footnote 
omitted). 
49. Wofford, Tire Blinding Light: Tire Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 502, 502 (1964). 
SO. There are numerous places in the book where the authors offer a few quotes and then 
generalize, concluding that the quotations were representative of widespread public sentiment, 
but offer no support for their generalization. See, e.g., pp. 75-76, 126-27. 
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majority of Americans favored this view. In fact, most of the authors' evi-
dence in favor of broad national economic powers is in the form of state-
ments by political leaders from active commercial states such as 
Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island (e.g., pp. 161, 168-69, 176-77). 
There is no doubt that merchants in these states favored a strong national 
government. However, merchants were a relatively small segment of the 
American population during the period that Crosskey and Jeffrey survey. 
Most people in America during this time were farmers, and Crosskey and 
Jeffrey offer no evidence that this group favored a powerful national gov-
ernment with expansive powers to regulate commerce.51 
Moreover, a close examination of the evidence presented by Crosskey 
and Jeffrey reveals that it does not support their claim that there was strong 
sentiment in favor of federal authority to regulate all commercial activities 
in the United States. The authors present literally dozens of quotations 
which, they contend, reflect support for congressional authority to regulate 
both intrastate and interstate commerce. Yet, almost all of these quotations 
speak of a need for federal regulation of "internal" and "external" com-
merce (e.g., pp. 100, 140, 173, 188, 191 and 318). The authors assume that 
references to "internal" and "external" commerce indicate a desire to be-
stow upon Congress the power to regulate all commerce in the country. 
However, an equally plausible interpretation of this language is that it re-
fers to a desire to establish congressional authority to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce. The authors never defend why they assume "internal" 
commerce should be interpreted to include intrastate activities.52 
In fact, the events of the time period surveyed by the authors indicate 
that the speakers quoted were probably advocating federal authority over 
interstate and foreign commerce. Before the Declaration of Independence 
was signed, the British Board of Trade controlled commercial transactions 
within and between the colonies.53 After the colonies broke away from 
Great Britain, there was no national commercial power. The states, fearful 
that they would be controlled by a central government, 54 refused to permit 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation to regulate commerce. Eco-
nomic chaos resulted as individual states set up trade barriers and economic 
sanctions with respect to goods from other states and goods passing through 
the state. 55 One commentator wrote: 
The states passed tariff laws against one another as well as against foreign 
nations; and indeed as far as commerce was concerned, each state treated 
the others as foreign nations. There were retaliations, discriminations, and 
every manner of trade restrictions and impediments which local ingenuity 
51. The authors present many examples of opposition to a strong national government, 
especially by the Southern states. See, e.g., pp. 197, 215, 217, 232-33, 283. 
52. Similarly, the authors present many quotations advocating vesting the federal govern• 
ment with "full power" to regulate commerce and assume that this phrase refers to authority to 
regulate both intrastate and interstate commerce. See, e.g., pp. 211, 318, 321, 362, 441. 
53. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J, YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW )32 
(1978). 
54. Id at 132. 
55. See, e.g., C. HEATHCOCK, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN PERSPECTIVE 20 
()972); F. BRODERICK, THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1776-1789 18 (1964); C, 
SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25-27 (2d ed. 1954). 
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and selfishness could devise. 56 
Surprisingly, Crosskey and Jeffrey devote little attention to detailing the 
barriers to interstate trade existing during this period. These obstructions 
are critical because the economic problems that resulted were the single 
largest impetus for the Constitutional Convention. Since the primary con-
cern was with interstate barriers to trade, it is quite likely that those who 
spoke of the need for congressional regulation of "internal" and "external" 
commerce were ref erring to interstate and foreign activities. As one histo-
rian has noted: "When they considered the need for regulating 'commerce 
with foreign nations and among the several state's, they were thinking only 
in terms of the national control of trade with the European countries and 
the removal of barriers obstructing the physical movements of goods across 
state lines."57 
The events at the Constitutional Convention further support the view 
that the commerce clause was meant to empower Congress only with au-
thority over interstate activity. The key proposal at the Convention provid-
ing for the powers of the national government came from Virginia 
Governor John Randolph. His resolution, presented early in the Conven-
tion's proceedings, read in part: 
[T]hat the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legis-
lative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legis-
late in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual Legislation.58 
All of the subsequent events at the Convention support the view that Con-
gress was to have authority in areas where the states were individually in-
competent to act.59 The states obviously were fully able to regulate purely 
intrastate economic activity; it was the interstate transactions that could not 
be handled by the states and, therefore, necessitated federal government 
action. 
At the very least, the authors' use of quotations that speak of a need for 
federal power to regulate "internal" and "external" commerce does not 
prove that there was support for congressional authority to control intra-
state economic activity. It is ironic that a book premised on the importance 
of correctly interpreting the meaning of words would so carelessly use these 
quotations to support its point. 
Similarly, the book uses quotations advocating the creation of a stronger 
national government as proof for the authors' view that the framers in-
tended to create an all powerful central government (pp. 137-43). While 
56. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARsHALL 310-11 (1916) (footnote omitted); C. 
SWISHER, supra note 55, at 25-27 (''New Jersey was embittered by the fact that both New York 
and Pennsylvania collected import duties on goods intended for sale in New Jersey ...• 
North Carolina suffered similarly from action taken by Virginia and South Carolina. The 
states collected duties, not merely on goods from abroad, but on those brought in from other 
states as well."). 
57. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 41 HARV. L. REv. 1335, 
1344 (1934) (footnote omitted). 
58. See, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERI-
CAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 117 (1927). 
59. See, e.g., id. at 389, 466. 
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some of the speakers quoted might have shared the authors' view of the role 
of the federal government, it is quite likely that many of those quoted had a 
far different plan in mind. The authors simply assume that advocacy of a 
strong federal government meant that the speakers favored a government 
with the power to regulate all economic activity occurring within the 
country. 
Finally, even if one were to assume that there were strong sentiments 
supporting the authors' view of the proper design for government, this does 
not mean that the Constitution adopted such a perspective. The authors 
minimize the strong opposition to the creation of a powerful national gov-
ernment (e.g., pp. 121, 197, 215, 217 and 232-33). There had been repeated 
unsuccessful efforts to give Congress powers to regulate commerce under 
the Articles of Confederation.60 The opposition is crucial because it makes 
it highly likely that the Constitution was a compromise, reflecting numerous 
concessions made by all of the states. As a document reflecting many com-
promises, the Constitution cannot· be analyzed or understood simply by re-
ferring to quotations from those favoring its creation during the period 
prior to its drafting.61 Accordingly, the methodology of Crosskey and Jef-
frey cannot possibly prove the proper meaning of the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the above is meant to imply that a history of the events between 
the signing of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitutional Con-
vention serves no purpose. To the contrary, a reexamination of that period 
can provide important insights into a critical stage of American constitu-
tional development. Crosskey and Jeffrey do not, however, set out simply 
to provide a history of a fascinating decade. Their entire effort is directed at 
proving a point and, as such, must be appraised on those terms. 
Certainly, there are places in the book where the authors discuss impor-
tant events that are often overlooked, or insufficiently dealt with, in other 
examinations of the period. For example, the discussion of the relationship 
of Shay's rebellion to the development of the Constitution (pp. 332-40), and 
the description of the events surrounding a proposed treaty with Spain in 
1786 (pp. 285-314), are interesting and important. Unfortunately, the few 
useful insights are buried in a book so poorly written as to be almost un-
readable. Often there are pages that contain little more than strings of quo-
tations tied together by sentence fragments (e.g., pp. 74-75, 147, 224, 288, 
317, 371 and 435). The prose is dense and difficult to follow. Unlike the 
initial volumes of Crosskey's work, the current volume offers little to rec-
ommend it. 
60. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 85 (1928); l G. BANCROFT, HIS• 
TORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 250-52 (1882); Pp. 
132-33. 
61. In fact, it is precisely for this reason, that so many people were involved in the drafting 
and ratification of the Constitution, that it is impossible to ever know the framers' intent. J. 
ELY, supra note 41, at 17; Shaman, supra note 2, at 267-68. 
